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a b s t r a c t
Global initiatives on debt relief call for increasing foreign aid assistance to alleviate income
inequality. But the potential gains from foreign aid policy coordination may be limited
by the willing participation of diverse and self-interested donor countries. If stability of
the foreign aid agreement does not occur, then aid effectiveness fails. Thus, the aim of
this paper is to investigate the effects of the stability of foreign aid agreement on income
redistribution amongst countries. The findings show that stability has positive effects on
incomemobility from the rich to the poorest countries reducing global income inequality.
© 2017 Economic Society of Australia, Queensland. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.
1. Introduction
Global initiatives call for increasing foreign aid assistance to alleviate income inequality. The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports continuing growth in Official Development Aid (ODA). In fact, during
1960–2013, total ODA disbursements has substantially increased and at least 3.5 trillion dollars have been given as foreign
aid from rich to poor countries. The largest donors result to be the United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
Furthermore, Qian (2015) reports that 24% (on average) of ODA during 2006–2012 for all donors countries was not
transferred to the recipient countries, but the aid money was instead spent on activities in donor countries, mainly for
debt relief, administrative costs and expenditure on refugees.
The literature on foreign aid is really rich, but the theoretical and empirical studies report quite different views on
the relationship between foreign aid and income. On the one hand, there exist studies supporting the positive effects of
the foreign aid. The endogenous growth model developed by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) shows that foreign aid provides
investment capital, whichwould generate income and raise up the return to capital and promote economic growth. Dalgaard
and Hansen (2001) show that there is a linear effect in the aid-income growth relationship due to diminishing returns to
foreign aid. Burnside andDollar (2000), Dollar andKraay (2001) andCollier andDollar (2002) suggest that foreign aid coupled
with good policies, such as private property rights, fiscal discipline, macroeconomic stability and open to trade, increase the
income of the poor countries. On the other hand, there are studies that show the failure of foreign aid to alleviate income
inequality. Bauer (1975) defines foreign aid as ‘‘a transfer of resources from the taxpayer of a donor country to the government of
a recipient country’’. Furthermore, he argues that as donors do not knowwhich investments are appropriate for the recipient
country, the transfer of foreign aid destroys economic incentives, leads to misallocation of scarce resources and undermines
economic growth. Based on both the history and the evidence on foreign aid, Easterly (2003) shares similar view as
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Bauer (1975) questioning about the alternative definition of ‘‘aid’’ ‘‘good policy’’ and ‘‘growth’’ to illustrate the complex
relationship between foreign aid and income and the high possibility of failure. Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008) conclude
that the aid literature has failed to prove that the effect of aid on growth is statistically larger than zero. The existing
empirical evidence on foreign aid also fails to prove an inequality decreasing effect on income distribution (i.e. Calderón
et al., 2006; Herzer and Nunnenkamp, 2012). The failure of foreign aid may due to various factors, such as poor governance
of foreign aid funding, inefficient and unfair aid distribution amongst the recipient countries, conditional requirements of
donor countries, political instability in the recipient countries (Dollar and Kraay, 2001; Inanga, 2008; Younas, 2008; Brück
and Xu, 2012; Kalyvitis et al., 2012a; Kalyvitis and Vlachaki, 2012b; Raschky and Schwindt, 2012). Furthermore, there are
some studies that have found ambiguous ormixed relationship between foreign aid and growth in the poor countries (Inanga
and Mandah, 2008; Werker et al., 2009; Ekanayake and Chatrna, 2010). Holder (2004) argues that the relationship between
foreign aid and growth turns out to be an inverted-U shaped under reasonable policy assumption, which is an Aid Laffer
Curve. Positive relationship between foreign aid and growth is located in the upward sloped side of the Aid Laffer Curve,
while the negative relationship is located at the downward sloped side of the Aid Laffer Curve. Similarly, in a sample of 42
aid recipients covering the period 1970–2000, Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2012b) find that there is a threshold level of aid, above
which the growth impact of aid becomes positive. The different views on the relationship between foreign aid and income
may related to the problems of data measurement and identification due to the heterogeneous nature of aid (Qian, 2015).
From the analysis of this literature one aspect emerges, that is, the stability of foreign aid agreement has not been still
now appropriately faced. The aim of foreign aid transfer may deviate from its original outcome of interest due to various
factors in each stage (creation, implementation, distribution and monitoring system) generating instability of the foreign
aid agreement. Generally, as the foreign aid increases the income of the recipient country and decreases that of the donors,
the free-rider problem arises due to the presence of multiple donors who are motivated by self-interest. Thus, the mere
coordination of aid, such as general budget supports, will not automatically guarantee the suboptimality of aid provisions
(Rahman and Sawad, 2012). Berrittella (2011) shows that if the gains from cooperation are largest, there are countries that
have incentive to defect from the foreign aid agreement. This suggests that the effects of the foreign aid agreement may
be biased if stability is not taken into account. In fact, ex-ante, the initial aid distribution in the agreement is established
to obtain defined outcome (i.e. economic growth, population well-being, institutional development, income redistribution)
in the recipient countries under the condition that no donor country defects, if this condition does not occur, ex-post, aid
effectiveness fails. Stability of the foreign aid agreement guarantees the aid effectiveness, both ex-ante and ex-post. In this
context, first of all, one question that merits to be faced is if stability of foreign aid agreement can increase the income
mobility from the rich to the poorest countries. Using a multi-country computable general equilibrium model (CGE), the
aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between stability and global income inequality. The main findings show
that the stability of the foreign aid agreement has positive effects on income redistribution from the donor to the recipient
countries and global income inequality decreases. As no country has incentive to free-ride, the income mobility from the
donor to the recipient countries will be effective.
2. Modeling framework
In order to assess the systematic general-equilibrium effects of foreign aid, amulti-country CGEmodel, labeled AIDCGEM
(Berrittella and Zhang, 2014), has been applied, which is a modified version of the standard GTAP model (Hertel, 1997).
A CGE model describes an economy in equilibrium with endogenously determined relative prices and quantities
guaranteeing theoretical and accounting consistency. Differently to partial equilibrium models, CGE models allow of
evaluating the effects of exogenous shift of policy variables on macroeconomic indicators (i.e. GDP, trade balance and
welfare), taking into account the interdependence among allmarkets and regions. A CGEmodel builds on a closed accounting
system of simultaneous equations representing market equilibrium: equality between supply and demand in each market
in the economy. As compared to other methods, one of the advantages is that CGE models can provide concrete measures
of changes in welfare due to policy change. This is particularly important for the aim of this paper, because the CGE model
allows of answering to questions on who are the winners and losers from changing foreign aid policies, providing policy
makers with a better understanding of the possible social results of the income redistribution from the rich to the poorest
countries. An assessment of the usefulness of CGE models for policy analysis can be found in Borges (1986), Shoven and
Whalley (1992) and Piermartini and The (2005). Furthermore, the CGE approach has been extensively used for the analysis
of foreign aid (i.e. Nugent, 1988; Nechyba, 1996; Arndt and Tarp, 2001; Clausen and Schürenberg-Frosch, 2012).
AIDGEM is a comparative static, multi-commodity, multi-region model with the assumptions of perfect competition,
market equilibrium and open economy.
On the consumption side, the economy is modeled by a representative household in each region r , whose Cobb–Douglas
utility function allocates expenditures between private consumption (C), government consumption (G) and savings
expenditure (S) as follows:
Ur = CαC,rr GαG,rr SαS,rr (1)
with αC,r , αG,r and αS,r income shares and αC,r + αG,r + αS,r = 1.
The constrained optimizing behavior of the household in region r for private consumption is represented by a non-
homothetic Constant Difference of Elasticity (CDE) expenditure function for the set of goods and services. A Cobb–Douglas
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sub-utility function is employed for government spending. In this case the expenditure shares are constant across all
commodities. Private and government consumption are split in a series of alternative composite Armington aggregates
(Armington, 1969).
On the production side, the producers receive payments for selling consumption goods to the private households and
the government, intermediate inputs to other producers and investment goods to the savings sector. Under the zero profit
assumption, these revenues must be precisely exhausted on expenditures for intermediate inputs and primary factors of
production. The nested production technology exhibits constant returns to scale and every sector produces a single output.
The technology is simplified by employing the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functional form:
yi,r =

n
j=1
θjx
1− 1σ
j,r
 σ
σ−1
(2)
where, in region r , yi,r is the production of the good i, xj,r is the input j, θj is a non-negative parameter, with
n
j=1 θj = 1,
and σ is the elasticity of substitution.
Both intermediate and final products from different regions are considered to be imperfectly substitutable with each
other (Armington, 1969). All factor inputs (land, labor, capital and natural resources) are assumed to be fully employed and
immobile across regions. Capital and labor are perfectly mobile across sectors and, hence, they earn the samemarket return
regardless of where they are employed; land and natural resources are sluggish to adjust and their returns may differ across
sectors.
Savings are exhausted on investment and capital markets are assumed to be in equilibrium only at the global level. If
savings exceed investments for one country, then it has a trade surplus; otherwise, it has a trade deficit. A hypothetical
world bank collects savings from all regions and allocates investments so as to achieve equality of changes in expected
future rates of return:
1ηr = 1η (3)
where1ηr and1η are the percentage change, respectively, in region’s rate of return and global rate of return.
Every economy includes government interventions. Private households and the government not only spend their
available income on consumption goods, but also pay taxes to the regional household. In the case of the government, taxes
consist of consumption taxes on commodities. In the case of private household, taxes consist of consumption taxes and
income tax net of subsidies. The firms have to pay taxes to the regional household. These value flows represent taxes on
intermediate inputs and production taxes net of subsidies. Also trade generated tax revenues and subsidy expenditures are
included in the GTAP model. All taxes levied in the economy always accrue to the regional household.
The foreign aid is inserted into the equation computing the national income as the total value of all domestic primary
resources. Thus, let AIDr be the income transfer in region r , the regional income is equal to:
Yr =
n
i=1
Pi,rEi,r + Tr + AIDr (4)
where Ei,r is the endowment i and Pi,r is the market price of the endowment i, Tr are the tax revenues. The income transfer
will increase (decrease) the regional income of the recipient (donor) country. To be consistent with general equilibrium
conditions, the algebraic sum of all income transfers introduced in the model equations must be zero. This ensures that the
redistribution of income is globally neutral.
2.1. Data calibration
The AIDCGEM model is calibrated for the year 2001 using the GTAP data base, version 6, which is a cross-section data
of international trade flows and national input–output tables. All the information in the data base is reported in values
converted to US dollars. The behavioral parameters utilized in the GTAP model are described in Dimaranan (2006). They
define the magnitude of behavioral responses to changes in relative prices. In particular, there are four sets of behavioral
parameters in GTAP data base: (i) elasticities of substitution, in both consumption and production; (ii) transformation
elasticities, that determine the degree of mobility of primary factors across sectors; (iii) the flexibilities of regional
investment allocation; (iv) consumer demand elasticities.
The GTAP data base includes 87 regions and 57 commodities. For this analysis, the regions are aggregated from 87
regions to 16 regions. The regional aggregation has been selected primarily based on importance in the world production,
consumption, international trade, economic development and geographic location. Thus, the regional aggregation includes
five donor countries and eleven recipient countries (Table 1).
As the GTAP 6 data base contains data for 2001, but the aid policy is designed for the year 2010, the methodology
described in Arndt et al. (1997) has been applied to provide a status quo projection of the global economy in the selected
year. The approach is based on a two-stage procedure. Firstly, ‘‘pseudo-calibrations’’ have been generated from 2001 to
2010 by calibrating the technical parameters related to population growth, capital and labour stock change, labour and land
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Table 1
Regional aggregation.
Source: Author’s modelling aggregation based on GTAP v.6 data base.
Acronym Region Type
USA United States Donor
CAN Canada Donor
WEU Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom)
Donor
JPK Japan and South Korea Donor
ANZ Australia, New Zealand and Oceania Donor
EEU Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia)
Recipient
FSU Former Soviet Union Recipient
MDE Middle East (Turkey, Rest of Middle East) Recipient
CAM Central America (Mexico, Central America, Caribbean) Recipient
SAM South America (Colombia, Perù, Venezuela, Rest of Andean Pact, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Rest of
South America)
Recipient
SAS South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Rest of South Asia) Recipient
SEA Southeast Asia (Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam) Recipient
CHI China (China, Hong Kong) Recipient
NAF North Africa (Morocco, Rest of North Africa) Recipient
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa (Botswana, Rest of SACU, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Other
Southern Africa, Uganda, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa)
Recipient
ROW Rest of the world Recipient
productivity change, so that to achieve growth in regional GDP consistent with the World Bank projections, as showed also
in Berrittella and Zhang (2014). The resulting scenario in this first stage is called ‘‘baseline’’. Subsequently, conventional
comparative analysis is conducted in the policy design simulations.
3. Stability conditions
A multi-country agreement is stable if each country gains, in terms of welfare, from joining it. The gains from the
agreement for country i (GfC i), with i = 1, . . . , n, are the difference between the welfare if there is the agreement, W iC ,
and the welfare if there is no agreement,W iNC , that is:
GfC i = W iC −W inc . (5)
Let T i be the minimum non-negative payment to country i necessary to make foreign aid agreement more attractive than
no agreement (called also side-payment), we have:
T i = max 0, W inc −W ic . (6)
The side-payment is a measure of the difficulty that will be encountered in reaching the agreement. The difficulty
to agreement refers to the incentive to do ex-ante negotiations, and not to the gains that will be sustained with ex-
ante negotiations by the countries. Clearly, T i may be zero for all i (i.e. in the extreme case, if the countries would be
homogeneous), but it cannot be positive for all i, otherwise, the world welfare from foreign aid agreement would be less
than the world welfare if there is no agreement.
The willingness to pay of country i,WTP i, is equal to the positive gains from the agreement, that is
WTP i = max 0, W ic −W inc . (7)
An agreement is stable if the sum of the willingness to pay is greater than the sum of the side-payments, that is if
j
WTP j ≥

i
T i with j+ i = n. (8)
In other words, let us define the agreement rate, s, as follows:
s =

j
WTP j
i
T i
(9)
if s ≥ 1 then the foreign aid agreement is stable.
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Table 2
Foreign aid distribution: first step.
Source: Author’s calculation.
Region Income transfer 1Wr (M ln US $)
Donor
United States −26076 −32485
Canada −5277 −6293
Western Europe −42585 −57010
Japan −10515 −13393
Australia, New Zealand & Oceania −3832 −4560
Recipient
Eastern Europe 3159 4483
Former Soviet Union 1435 1833
Middle East 2588 4430
Central America 6238 7657
South America 2915 3999
South Asia 14722 16831
Southeast Asia 5696 6615
China 1791 1936
North Africa 1666 2299
Sub-Saharan Africa 25742 32005
Rest of the World 22333 28746
4. Policy design and results
The procedure to calculate the optimal foreign aid distribution includes two steps. Firstly, the simulation of the initial
aid distribution, which will give the welfare change for any country r,1Wr . If welfare change is positive for country r , then
country r has incentive to participate to the foreign aid agreement both ex-ante, in terms of side-payments, and ex-post
in terms of gains from cooperation. The opposite effects occur if welfare change is negative. Furthermore, if the stability
condition in Eq. (8) occurs (that is: s ≥ 1) then no country has incentive to defect from the agreement. Otherwise, the
initial foreign aid distribution must be modified to guarantee the stability condition in Eq. (8). Secondly, given the initial aid
transfer for country r , the associated endogenous welfare change for country r is recalculated such that the sum of welfare
changes is equal to zero, as follows:
1W˜r = 1Wr −

r
1Wr
|1Wr |
r
|1Wr | . (10)
The values of welfare change, calculated in Eq. (10), are exogenously simulated and this simulationwill give the endogenous
foreign aid distribution.
This two-step procedure allows of identifying the aid distribution that satisfies the stability conditions given the initial
aid allocation.
Tables 2 and 3 report the simulation results of this two-step procedure. Table 2 identifies the initial aid distribution in
terms of income transfer, negative for the donor countries and positive for the recipient countries. Data on the initial foreign
aid distribution is extracted from the OECD STAT database (OECD, 2012) and World Bank data set (World Bank, 2012), and
the standard measure of aid is used, which corresponds to the Net Official Development Assistance. The largest donors are
the European countries (mainly France, Germany and the United Kingdom) and the United States, contributing, respectively,
by 50% and 30%. The main recipients are the Sub-Saharan African countries, that result to have received almost 30% of the
total amount of foreign aid. The simulation of the income transfer related to the foreign aid increaseswelfare of the recipients
and decreases that of the donors.
Furthermore, Table 3 reports thewelfare change for country r such that the sumofwelfare changes is equal to zero. These
values are exogenously simulated in the second step thatwill give the endogenous foreign aid distribution. Stability requires
an increase of the foreign aid for the donor countries, except for Japan. The donors with the lowest initial income transfer
(Canada, Australia New Zealand and Oceania) have to increase the foreign aid more than the other donors. Furthermore,
stability requires a redistribution of the foreign aid amongst the recipient countries, with a substantial increase for the
Middle East and South America. Foreign aid redistribution implies that the recipientswith the highest initial income transfer
(such as the Sub-Saharan African countries) will have a decrease in their income transfer. Many of the recipient countries
will receive an increase in their income transfer due to the foreign aid redistribution.
The aid effects on income per capita are negative for the donor countries and positive for the recipient countries. This
means that there is an income redistribution from the rich to the poor countries. In particular, the donors with the lowest
income transfer yield the highest negative change in income per capita. For the recipient countries, the results suggest a
U-inverted curve in the relationship between foreign aid distribution and change in income per capita. If on the one hand,
the recipients that receive the highest income transfer have also the highest change in income per capita, for example Rest
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Table 3
Foreign aid distribution: second step.
Source: Author’s calculation.
Region 1W˜r (M ln US $) Aid distribution (%)a Income per capita
(%)b (%)a
Donor
United States −32065 0.063 −0.694 0.002
Canada −6211 0.402 −1.153 0.010
Western Europe −56273 0.023 −0.800 0.007
Japan −13219 −0.594 −0.459 −0.004
Australia, New Zealand & Oceania −4501 0.391 −1.299 0.013
Recipient
Eastern Europe 4541 0.151 1.613 0.018
Former Soviet Union 1857 0.625 0.455 −0.001
Middle East 4487 0.869 0.753 0.004
Central America 7756 −0.021 1.629 0.018
South America 4051 0.968 0.389 −0.003
South Asia 17049 −0.115 4.576 0.051
Southeast Asia 6701 −0.014 0.605 0.005
China 1961 0.407 0.242 −0.001
North Africa 2328 0.160 1.138 0.011
Sub-Saharan Africa 32419 −0.122 9.969 0.118
Rest of the World 29118 −0.108 13.192 0.157
a Change with respect to the initial aid distribution (no stability).
b Change with respect to the baseline scenario.
Fig. 1. Gini index.
Source: Author’s calculation from UNU-WIDER (2005) and World Bank (2012).
of the World and Sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, we have that the recipients with the lowest income transfer not
always have the lowest change in income per capita, for example, North Africa. The comparison with ‘‘no stability’’ scenario,
in terms of income per capita, shows that stability enforces the income redistribution.
The income mobility from the rich to the poorest countries is also supported in terms of global income inequality (GII)
index calculated as in Milanovic (2006):
GII =
n
i=1
Gipiπi + 1
µ
n
i
n
j>1

yj − yi

pipj (11)
where yi is the per-capita income of ith country, pi is the population share of ith country in total world population, πi is the
share of ith country in total global income, µ is the income mean, n is the number of countries and Gi is the Gini coefficient
of national income distribution.
Data on Gini coefficient of national income distribution (Gi) come from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID)
compiled by UNU-WIDER (2005) and the World Bank data set (World Bank, 2012), which contains a comprehensive
collection of within country inequality data from several thousand underlying statistical surveys and is a very broad
collection of national income distributions data. Fig. 1 shows the income inequality per country. For each country, the most
recent data on Gini coefficient has been selected over the period 2000–2010. The GII index decreases from 67.73 in the
baseline equilibrium to 67.04 in the stability scenario allowing income mobility from the rich to the poorest countries.
5. Concluding remarks
As the stability of the foreign aid agreement is a critical challenge for the success of aid assistance, the aim of this paper
has been to investigate if stability of foreign aid agreement promotes income redistribution from the donor to the recipient
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countries. The main findings show that there is a positive effect of stability of foreign aid agreement on the incomemobility
from the rich to the poorest countries.
If the foreign aid distribution occurs on the basis of the stability conditions, then no country has incentive to free-ride
and the income redistribution will be effective. This suggests that policy-makers must identify ex-ante the aid distribution
that satisfies the stability conditions in order to avoid the failure of foreign aid.
The simulation analysis and results of this paper call for further research that investigates the relationship between
stability of foreign aid agreement and income inequality; in particular, research on the design of global transfers that
satisfy the requirement that income inequality decreases in both donor and recipient countries; application of alternative
methodologies to the CGEmodelling framework that take into account the problems ofmeasurement and identification due
to the heterogenous nature of foreign aid.
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